tal amount of credit card fraud in 1982, including that which involved bank cards, retail store cards, and gas cards, was approximately one billion dollars, and annual losses soon could reach two billion dollars. 6 The cost of this fraud ultimately is borne by the consumer. 7 Several factors explain the enormous rise in credit card fraud. 8 First, the increased use of credit cards contributes to increased credit card fraud. Increased card usage, however, accounts for only a portion of the escalation of credit card fraud because card fraud is growing considerably faster than overall card usage. 9 Second, the ease with which an individual can commit credit card fraud contributes to the problem. 1 0 Potential criminals can obtain credit cards or account numbers and know that a cardholder cannot easily detect this fraud. A variety of people regularly handle others' credit cards or account numbers, 1 therefore, a cardholder has difficulty identifying the thief. Furthermore, the cardholder is unlikely to discover the fraud in time to prevent it,12 especially if the criminal steals an account number. Frequently, cardholders do not know that unauthorized persons have used their credit cards or ac-J. McLaughlin 7 See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., supra note 5, at 78 (customers pay for costs of credit card fraud through higher interest rates and larger annual card fees).
s Card issuers have been unsuccessful in limiting credit card fraud despite developing cards that are difficult to counterfeit and financing "sting" operations aimed at catching credit card fraud criminals. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., supra note 5, at 79 (VISA began financing a "sting" operation); N.Y. Times, supra note 6, at 12 (issuers developing carbonless forms); N.Y. Times, March 2, 1983, § 4, at 20 (Mastercard added hard to duplicate hologram to their credit card). While issuers may have some shortterm impact, criminals usually quickly overcome new issuer security measures. See Senate Hearing, supra note 5, at 14 (statement of Charles P. Nelson, Assistant Chief Postal Inspector for Criminal Investigation); U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., supra note 5, at 79. count numbers until they receive their monthly statements.' 3 Thus, credit card thieves make two-thirds of their purchases before owners suspect that their cards are being used fraudulently. 14 Third, not only does credit card fraud usually remain undetected until long after the criminal has completed the crime, but also law enforcement efforts are lax. 15 Law enforcement agencies have "paid little attention to this genre of crime." 1 6 Thus, these agencies are partially responsible for the growth in credit card fraud.
Finally, although these factors all contribute to the problem of credit card fraud, inadequate state and federal laws are the biggest reason for the success of credit card fraud.' 7 As this Comment will demonstrate, prosecutors litigate organized fraud schemes primarily at the federal level which is where the weaknesses in the laws have been the most glaring.
While petty crimes constitute the majority of credit card fraud incidents,' 8 this Comment focuses on the fraud committed in large organized schemes that account for half of the total dollar amount of credit card fraud.' 9 Nevertheless, the states have a vital role in combatting credit card fraud because they are better equipped than the federal government to prosecute local crimes. 20 There is an amalgam of state statutes, 2 ' each statute having its own idiosyncra- Whoever knowingly in a transaction affecting interstate or foreign commerce, uses section 1644 to apply, a person must commit at least one thousand dollars of credit card fraud in a one year period. 2 9 The statute does not outlaw the use of an unauthorized account number, but rather, prohibits only the use of an illegal card.
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Because credit card fraud is not the primary focus of the Truth in Lending Act, the Act is not as helpful in prosecuting credit card fraud as it could be. Congress wanted the Truth in Lending Act to protect consumers; however, the Act does not mention credit card fraud in the purpose section of the statute. 3 1 The reason for this omission is that the primary purpose of the Truth in Lending Act is to promote the informed use of credit, not to reduce credit card fraud. 3 2 Nevertheless, one commentator has stated that Congress passed the law to protect the consumer, 3 3 and the judiciary has adopted this interpretation of the Truth in Lending Act. Federal authorities also have used other statutes to prosecute credit card fraud. Chief among these is the mail fraud statute. 35 This statute prohibits the use of the mail to perpetrate credit card fraud. Similarily, the wire fraud statute proscribes the use of wire communication equipment to accomplish a fraudulent credit card scheme. 3 6 or attempts to use any counterfeit, fictitious, altered, forged, lost, stolen, or fraudulently obtained credit card to obtain money, goods, services, or anything else of value which within any one-year period has a value aggregating $1,000 or more.... Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1644(a) (1982 35 The mail fraud statute reads as follows: Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) . 36 The wire fraud statute parallels the mail fraud statute, except that it applies to
Prosecutors use the preceding statutes to prosecute credit card fraud. The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 197837 regulates credit card fraud investigations. The statute specifies the parameters within which the enforcement agencies may question credit card issuers about fraud. 38 Law enforcement agencies must already be conducting an inquiry into a specific potential violation before the issuer has to release the relevant records. 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE OLD FEDERAL LAWS
Before the passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, the federal statutory scheme for credit card fraud had several weaknesses. The major problems included: the prosecution of criminals who committed credit card fraud by using the credit card account number, but not the credit card itself; the aggregation requirement; the definition of fraudulent acts; the use of the mail and wire fraud statutes to prosecute credit card fraud; and, the financial privacy laws.
A. ACCOUNT NUMBER
Criminals do not need an actual credit card to commit fraud. All they need is the account number. For instance, criminals can print white plastic by using the account number without the actual credit card. In white plastic schemes, criminals emboss account numbers on plain pieces of plastic. Next, they imprint invoices with these cards; then, collusive merchants accept these invoices, thereby completing the scheme. 40 Counterfeiters also can print cards with actual credit card numbers that they obtain in a variety of ways, including from carbons of credit card purchase receipts. 4 ' Furthermore, by using an unauthorized credit card number to purchase products by mail order, criminals can accomplish credit card fraud without using the actual card. [Vol. 76
CREDIT CARD FRAUD
Courts have split over whether section 1644 penalizes the unauthorized use of an account number, or whether the law penalizes only the illegal use of a credit card. The two appeals courts that have heard cases on this point disagree on the issue.
3
The first of these cases was United States v. Callihan. 4 4 In Callihan, the appellant communicated the illegally obtained numbers by telephone across state lines. 4 5 The district court found Callihan guilty of three counts of wire fraud and five counts of credit card fraud. 4 6 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed the wire fraud convictions, but reversed the credit card fraud convictions. 4 7 The majority held that Congress clearly intended to exclude the use of account numbers from the ambit of section 1644 . 48 The court noted that otherwise Congress would have specifically prohibited the illegal use of mere account numbers, as it did in the mail and wire fraud statutes.
49
One year after Callihan, the Fourth Circuit held that section 1644 does prohibit the unauthorized use of account numbers. 50 In United States v. Bice-Bey, 5 1 the appellant ordered merchandise from an out-of-state firm by using an unauthorized card number. 5 2 The court found her liable under section 1644 for credit card fraud. The unanimous court acknowledged that there was some merit in the appellant's contention that section 1644 proscribed only fraudulent credit card usage and not the unauthorized use of an account number. 5 4 The court, however, dismissed the arguments as unconvincing and held that the judiciary must construe section 1644 as prohibiting the fraudulent use of a mere account number so as "not to defeat the congressional purpose. .... 55 The Ninth Circuit's definition of a credit card for the purposes of section 1644 is clearly the correct one because the Truth in Lending Act defines a credit card as a device. 5 7 Thus, the statute does not prohibit the fraudulent use of an account number because an account number is an intangible, not a device. Yet, criminals can commit a substantial amount of credit card fraud without possessing the card. 58 Therefore, the narrow definition of a credit card is a large loophole in section 1644. The Fifth Circuit is currently the sole proponent of the minority position that the jurisdictional amount in section 1644 can be met by aggregating purchases made using several fraudulent cards. 6 60 See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 4, at 178 (statement ofJohn C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the Department ofJustice). The federal government usually will not prosecute credit card fraud unless the amount in question is at least $10,000; in the more overloaded federal district courts, the amount tends to be at least $50,000. See NATION 
C. REQUISITE FRAUDULENT ACT
In order to be within the purview of section 1644, a person must "knowingly ... use any counterfeit, fictitious, altered, forged, lost, stolen or fraudulently obtained credit card ... "66 This portion of the statute contains two loopholes. First, the expression "fraudulently obtained" is underinclusive: it excludes some behavior that is unauthorized by the issuing credit card company. Parties enter transactions whereby cardholders sell their cards to other individuals. 6 7 The cardholders then report their cards as lost or stolen, while the card purchasers amass large bills. 68 These card buyers are not subject to the provisions of the statute because they obtained the credit cards without using fraud. 69 Second, section 1644 does not prohibit the mere possession of fraudulent credit cards or counterfeiting equipment. 70 Therefore, law enforcement officials must apprehend these criminals actually purchasing merchandise with the fraudulent credit cards. As a result, prosecutors have a very difficult time proving that a person has violated the statute.
7 '
The need for a statute forbidding the possession of fraudulent credit cards is apparent in cases where the cardholder lied in order to obtain the card. If there is not a statute prohibiting the mere possession of illegal credit cards, the prosecutor must demonstrate that the issuer relied on a false statement of the cardholder. 7 2 Also, without this type of statute, law enforcement officials have the potentially nettlesome problem of proving that a criminal fraudulently obtained a credit card. 73 This loophole in section 1644 forces the government to establish much more than mere possession of illegal credit cards, even though unauthorized possession is a sufficiently serious crime to warrant prosecution.
D. MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD STATUTES
The mail and wire fraud statutes sometimes are applicable in credit card fraud cases. 74 These statutes are difficult for prosecutors to utilize, however, because the statutes require prosecutors to demonstrate a nexus between the use of the mail or wires and the execution of the fraud. the Sixth Circuit 8 2 holding that the mailings of sales slips were insufficient for the mail fraud statute to govern the fraud. 8 3 The majority reasoned that Maze's scheme was complete when he received the goods and services. 8 4 According to this line of reasoning, it was irrelevant to Maze's scheme that merchants had mailed the sales slips across state lines.
5
Chief Justice Burger dissented in order to emphasize that the majority's decision did not totally preclude the government from using the mail fraud statute to prosecute credit card fraud. 86 He concluded that the decision should be limited to its facts. 8 7 Justice White also dissented, stressing that it was the mailings that created the delay that enabled Maze to execute his scheme. 8 8 He also objected to the majority's narrow interpretation of section 1341. 89 Prosecutions of credit card fraud under the mail fraud statute have decreased since Maze, but not to the degree predicted by the dissenters. 90 In cases in which people execute the fraud by submitting false credit card applications, the courts have held that the mail fraud statute applies. 9 ' Also, where merchants colloborate in the fraudulent scheme, the use of the mail is necessary to execute the scheme. Therefore, the Third Circuit held that the mail fraud stat-ute applies to such an arrangement. The use of the wire fraud statute is a more recent development in the prosecution of credit card fraud. 9 3 In United States v. Muni, 9 4 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a merchant participating in a fraudulent scheme over the telephone violated the wire fraud statute. 9 5 The court concluded that telephoning for authorization of the credit card purchase was a necessary part of the fraud; therefore, the merchant violated the wire fraud statute because he used the wires to perpetrate the credit card fraud. 96 In the later case of United States v. DeBiasi, 97 the Second Circuit extended this rationale one step further. In that case, the court held that a purchaser of merchandise in large fraudulent credit card transactions knows that the merchant must obtain telephone authorization, and thus violates the wire fraud statute. 98 The result of this theory is that the wire fraud statute applies in most credit card fraud cases.
E. FINANCIAL PRIVACY
In order to enforce the federal credit card laws, the government must be able to undertake thorough investigations of credit card charges. The financial privacy statute, however, limits investigators' access to cardholders' records 9 9 to situations in which the investigators already have begun an inquiry into a specific incident. 100 In order to determine whether to begin an investigation of possible fraudulent credit card activity,' 0 ' federal officials argue that investigators should have access to issuer records prior to the initiation of official investigations. Investigators could do a better 
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[Vol. 76 job of uncovering patterns of fraudulent behavior by having greater access to credit card records. This reform would not lead to undue intrusion upon a cardholder's privacy because the bank already has access to these records, and investigators would not reveal the discovered information. fifteen card limit is excessive, it is an improvement on section 1644 which does not penalize the possession of illegal credit cards. This new provision helps ease the government's burden of proof in credit card fraud cases because the government will not have to apprehend an individual in the act of committing credit card fraud. 10 9 Thus, the new Act should enable prosecutors to eschew using the unwieldy mail and wire fraud statutes.
IV. THE CREDIT
Fourth, the new statute attempts to clarify the aggregation requirement." 1 0 In cases involving devices that are unauthorized but not counterfeit, the courts will aggregate the value of the criminal's credit fraud, regardless of the number of cards involved."' This provision will help eliminate the problems of the aggregation requirement in section 1644.112
Fifth, the new statute punishes both those persons who produce counterfeit credit cards" 13 and those persons who possess device making equipment." t 4 Furthermore, the omission of a minimum statutory amount requirement in cases involving counterfeit credit cards'15 indicates Congress' intent to simplify the proof of counterfeiting. Because most counterfeiters are involved in large fraudulent schemes, the omission of a minimum statutory amount requirement fortunately will not cause a significant increase in the number of federal prosecutions of counterfeiting. The omission simply will reduce the prosecutor's burden of proof in counterfeiting cases.
The Credit Card Fraud Act apparently is not a replacement for section 1644; rather, it supplements the already existing credit card fraud statute."1 6 Presumably, once federal prosecutors have become accustomed to the new statute, they will employ primarily the new statute because it simplifies their burden of proof and increases the potential penalty for those convicted of credit card fraud. The penalties under the Credit Card Fraud Act 12 5 and the Truth in Lending Act 12 6 for the unauthorized use or possession of credit cards are essentially the same. Both acts set a maximum of ten years in prison and a ten thousand dollar fine.' 27 The new statute, however, also provides for a greater monetary penalty in egregious cases.' 28 This provision has the same beneficial deterrent effect as a restitution provision. 129 Under the Credit Card Fraud Act, counterfeiting or possession of device-making equipment also carries a greater penalty than other types of credit card fraud. 13 0 The statute provides for "a fine of not more than the greater of $50,000 or twice the value obtained by the offense or imprisonment for not more than fifteen years, or both.... ." 131 This stringent penalty should deter any criminal, even a member of organized crime. 132 Although the penalty should be an effective deterrent for counterfeiting, in rare cases it might cause inequitable treatment, 3 3 and thereby possibly violate the equal protection clause. 134
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has examined the present state of credit card fraud. The enormous impact of credit cards in our society cannot be overemphasized. Unfortunately, credit card fraud is increasing even faster than overall credit card use. The losses resulting from credit card fraud are staggering, and the unfortunate result is that customers bear those losses. 
CREDIT CARD FRAUD
The key to reducing large credit card fraud schemes is a wellwritten federal statute. Although the states have a vital role in small cases, they are not capable of prosecuting large interstate schemes effectively. Card issuers have taken measures to limit credit card fraud and these measures can have some short-term impact. Criminals, however, are able to overcome issuers' new obstacles in a short period of time. Cardholders also are unable to prevent misuse because they often are unaware of the fraud until they receive their monthly credit card statements.
The old federal statutory scheme has several shortcomings. It is unclear whether section 1644 prohibits the unauthorized use of an account number. The aggregation requirement also is uncertain. Furthermore, the statute does not prohibit the possession of "bad" credit cards; therefore, prosecutors frequently had to use the unwieldy mail and wire fraud statutes.
The Credit Card Fraud Act of 1984 corrects most of the problems of previous federal statutory schemes. The new statute punishes fraudulent use of an account number, eliminates the "fraudulently obtained" loophole of the old statute, punishes mere possession of illegal credit cards, clarifies the aggregation requirement, and punishes the counterfeiting of credit cards and possession of counterfeiting equipment. The new statute, however, has two major flaws: first, it defines "credit card" too broadly; and second, it treats certain similarly situated individuals unequally.
In addition to redefining "credit card" so to exclude automated bank cards and electronic fund transfers from the ambit of the new statute, and eliminating the potentially unequal operation of the statute upon similarily situated individuals, Congress needs to amend the Financial Privacy Act to allow authorities greater access to issuer records. Furthermore, the federal government should devote greater resources to the investigation of credit card fraud. These changes are necessary to combat the formidable problem of credit card fraud. BRIAN 
F. CAMINER

